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ON CHANGE AND THE LAW OF CONTRACTS:
A TRIBUTE TO JOE PERILLO
Richard E. Speidel*
I.
It is an honor to be included in the Festschrift for Joe Perillo.
Joe and I are professional rather than personal acquaintances. We
have talked at the occasional meeting or conference, corresponded,
and exchanged articles. Regrettably, I have never been his colleague
at the same law school or worked with him on a project. But there is a
link between us. We were born in the same year (1933), attended law
school in the 1950s, started teaching law in the early 1960s, and have
taught and written about contracts for the last forty years!1 We have a
common subject matter and are the intellectual heirs of the so-called
"realists," especially Arthur L. Corbin and Karl N. Llewellyn.
When we started teaching, change was in the air. Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code had attacked the foundations of classical
contract in the First Restatement of Contracts, and the planning for
the "neo-classical" Second Restatement of Contracts was already
underway. At the same time, we tried to weather and adapt to the
storms of social and theoretical change that arose over the next thirty
years, including economic analysis of law, consumerism, the critical
legal studies movements, relational contracting,2 and now the "new
formalism." 3 Moreover, we have participated in and benefited from
the enormous growth of legal education and have witnessed the
technological
innovations,
commercial
treaties,
and
other
developments that have facilitated the globalization of commercial
law. These have been interesting and heady times.

Beatrice Kuhn Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law.
1. Also, we have both participated in the Fulbright Program and experienced the
joy and pain of being a law school dean.
2. For an admirable analysis and application of these theories, see Robert A.
Hillman, The Richness of Contract Law: An Analysis and Critique of Contemporary
Theories of Contract Law (1997).
3. See, e.g., Symposium: Formalism Revisited, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 527 (1999).
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II.

By every objective standard, Joe Perillo has had a highly successful4
career. He is the author of several influential articles about contracts
and the co-author with the late John D. Calamari of a contracts

casebook5 and an important treatise on the law of contracts, now in its
fourth edition.6 Moreover, he is the driving force behind the ongoing
and highly successful project to revise Arthur L. Corbin's great
treatise on contracts. 7 If this were not enough, he is a skilled

comparativist and has taught and influenced in immeasurable ways
thousands of students, attorneys, and judges over the years. So it
might suffice simply to say, "Congratulations, Joe. Well done. Enjoy
a healthy and happy retirement."
Yet there is a remarkable thing about the Treatise. According to
Westlaw, the Treatise has been cited (since 1981) 747 times in the
legal periodicals.8 That alone would be noteworthy. But the Treatise
has also been cited 306 times by the state courts and 221 times by the

federal courts. This is unique for a one-volume treatise on contracts, 9
and the consistent citation by courts is unheard of for articles or
university press books on contracts."' Joe, your Treatise has cracked
through the wall of resistance between the academy and the real
world and is actually read and used by lawyers who try contract cases
and judges who decide them.'
4. Some of these articles include Joseph M. Perillo, Exchange, Contractand Law
in the Stone Age, 31 Ariz. L. Rev. 17 (1989); Misreading Oliver Wendell Holmes on
Efficient Breach and Tortious Interference, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 1085 (2000); The
Originsof the Objective Theory of Contract Formationand Interpretation,69 Fordham
L. Rev. 427 (2000); A Plea for a Uniform Parol Evidence Rule and Principles of
ContractInterpretation(with John D. Calamari), 42 Ind. L.J. 333 (1967); Restitution in
a ContractualContext, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 1208 (1973); The Statute of Frauds in Light
of the Functions and Dysfunctions of Form, 43 Fordham L. Rev. 39 (1974).
5. See John D. Calamari, Joseph M. Perillo & Helen Hadjiyannakis Bender,
Cases and Problems on Contracts (3d ed. 2000).
6. John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts (4th ed. 1998).
7. Perillo's admiration of Corbin shines through in Joseph M. Perillo, Jr., Twelve
Letters from Arthur L. Corbin to Robert Braucher, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 755
(1993).
8. All of the citation figures listed in this article are approximate. Results may
vary considerably, depending on the electronic database used, and the search criteria
provided. See also infra notes 9, 10, 12.
9. By contrast, Farnsworth on Contracts (3d ed. 1999) has been cited 1890 times
by the periodicals and 1410 times by the courts, and Murray on Contracts (4th ed.
2001) has been cited 333 times by the periodicals and 194 times by the courts. The alltime leader (apparently) is the White and Summers treatise on the Uniform
Commercial Code (5th ed. 2000), which has been cited 2576 times in the periodicals
and 3502 times by the courts.
10. For example, the articles and books on contracts by Professor Melvin A.
Eisenberg have been cited 1351 times in the periodicals and 23 times in the courts,
and the excellent work of Professor Richard Craswell, focusing on the economic
analysis of contracts, has been cited 696 times in the periodicals and only 7 times in
the courts.
11. See Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Lawyers' Contracts Is Different, 67
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So maybe I should stop here in awe of the result 12 and expand the
adjectives needed to celebrate your accomplishment. But there is a
bit more to say. Why, do you suppose, has the Treatise cracked
through to the courts? An elitist might say that treatises are not
scholarship because they focus on doctrine rather than theory, and a
cynic might argue that treatises are usually cited to confirm or bolster
a conclusion reached from other sources. In other words, a treatise,
even if cited by the courts, is really a semi-scholarly afterthought.
III.
A full scale effort to confirm or deny these assertions would require
an inquiry into the nature and forms of legal scholarship and a
systematic examination of the cases to see how the Treatise has been
used. This examination will not be undertaken here. Suffice it to say
that productive legal scholarship takes many forms, and that the
recurring judicial citations of the Treatise to support or confirm a
decision made from primary sources are still a high compliment to the
author. Moreover, a Treatise like Joe's that is well-written, analytical,
and takes account of relevant doctrinal developments is a welcome
addition on anyone's shelf. There is a quality there that instills
confidence.
But let us employ a familiar hypothetical to venture one step
farther. Suppose that Seller and Buyer enter into a ten-year contract
for the supply of equipment to be manufactured by S from
specifications supplied by B.
S agrees to supply B's annual
requirements within a stated maximum and minimum range, and B
agrees to pay S $1000 per unit, subject to an annual escalation up or
down under a formula worked out in the negotiations. After four
years of performance, the industry is suddenly hit by an energy crisis,
coupled with a sharp increase in market demand for the equipment. S
discovers that the escalation clause, drafted to track various
anticipated cost increases and decreases, does not track the increase in
energy costs. Thus, it will now cost S $2500 to make each unit, for
which it will be paid $1200 under the contract. Also, B has begun to
order the maximum amount under the contract, realizing that it can
now resell the units it does not consume to third parties for $3000 a
unit. S refuses to perform, claiming that it is entitled to relief from the
changed circumstances, either through discharge from the contract or
by an order enforcing the contract with an adjusted price term. 3
Fordham L. Rev. 443 (1998).
12. My arbitration treatise with Ian Macneil and Tom Stipanowich, published in
1994 and out of print since 1999, has been cited around 240 times in the periodicals
and 39 times by the state and federal courts. See Ian R. Macneil, Richard E. Speidel,
& Thomas Stipanowich, Federal Arbitration Law: Agreements, Awards, and
Remedies under the Federal Arbitration Act (1994, supp. 1999).
13. The facts are loosely drawn from Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group,
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Suppose that all the court had to work with was the Treatise,
particularly chapter thirteen (in the fourth edition) dealing with
"Impossibility or impracticability of performance, frustration of the
venture." How might the case be decided?
Initially, we are told that relief in cases of changed circumstances
depends upon three conditions: (1) the contract did not allocate the
risk; (2) the changed circumstances were not expected (not
foreseeable); and (3) the changed circumstances must have made
performance "commercially impracticable."14 We also learn that the
traditional cases for "almost automatic excuse" are not present hereno essential person has died, the subject matter of the contract was
not destroyed, and no supervening government act made performance
illegal or impracticable. 5 Nevertheless,
[Beyond these traditional cases] relief is most justified if unexpected
events inflict a loss on one party and provide a windfall gain for the
other or where the excuse would save one party from an unexpected
loss while leaving the other party
6 in a position no worse than it
would have without the contract.'
In these cases, the Treatise suggests that the presence of an
imbalance produced by unanticipated changed circumstances is
something "that the impossibility doctrine may redress."'"
This is our case, right? The seller will incur substantial, unexpected
increased costs (the escalator clause did not work), and the buyer
seems to have a windfall. Even so, the buyer will not be worse off (a
pareto optimal move) if some relief is granted. 8
This imbalance theory, however, will not work if the contract
allocated the risk to S. For example, an escalator clause, like a fixedprice, contract can be viewed as an allocation to S of the risk of price
or cost increases. Similarly, a requirements contract with a maximum
quantity provision puts a ceiling on B's incentive to order more in a
rising market. Section 2-306(l) of the U.C.C., with its requirement
that actual requirements be in good faith and not "unreasonably
disproportionate," provides a further limitation.
The Treatise

Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
14. The Treatise draws a careful and proper distinction between risk allocated by
the contract and risk allocation supplied or imposed by law. Calamari & Perillo,
supra note 6, § 13.2.
15. Id. § 13.1, at 496. Five categories of excuse for impracticability are stated at
section 13.2, at 498. Another category of excuse not involved in our case is the socalled "frustration of purpose" doctrine. See id. § 13.12.
16. Id. § 13.1, at 496.
17. Id.
18. In addition to an efficient result, the relief has some moral force in that the
nonperformance was excused by law. See Gil Lahav, A Principleof Justified PromiseBreaking and its Application in Contract Law, 57 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. L. 163 (2000)
(discussing breaches that are economically and morally efficient).
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recognizes this first principle of agreed risk allocation and leaves the
contract interpretation issue to the courts.1 9
Let us assume that the price escalation clause, which apparently
failed the purpose for which it was intended, is held not to allocate to
S the risk in this case. 0 What else does the Treatise say about
whether a court should correct the imbalance caused by changed
circumstances?
In all probability, a court would probably ask whether the risk, as a
matter of policy, should still be imposed on the seller, and answer the
question in the negative if both parties assumed that changed
circumstances would not cause the escalation clause to fail and the
changed circumstances made the agreed performance impracticable.
On the impracticability issue, the Treatise reports, correctly I
believe, that impracticability is rarely found where the defense was
based "solely on the basis of increased costs,"' although other legal
systems "impose price adjustments in cases of unforeseen drastic
variations in prices."22 If, however, the cost of performance is
significantly increased because changed circumstances require
"performing in a manner radically different from what was originally
contemplated," impracticability may be found.23
On the legal assumption of risk issue (basic assumption), the
Treatise notes that the fundamental issue "is one of equitable
allocation." As Cardozo put it, the court must balance the
community's interest in having contracts performed against "the
commercial senselessness of requiring performance."'24 According to
the Treatise, a primary method for striking the balance (assuming that
performance as agreed has become impracticable) is through the
concept of foreseeability applied with an eye to the "larger
consequences" of the determination.
The Treatise suggests a
working definition of foreseeability that focuses on the probability
that an event that is foreseeable is likely to occur:
A sensible approach is to define the unforeseeable in the following
way: an event so unlikely to occur that reasonable parties see no
need explicitly to allocate the risk of its occurrence, although the
impact it might have would be of such magnitude that the parties
6
would have negotiated over it, had the event been more likely.l

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Calamari & Perillo, supra note 6, § 13.1, at 496, 498, 522-24.
See U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (1987) (agreed remedy "fail[s] of its essential purpose").
Calamari & Perillo, supra note 6, § 13.9, at 512.
Id. § 13.9, at 513.
Id. § 13.9, at 512-13.
Id. § 13.16, at 522.
Id. § 13.18, at 526.
Id. See Specialty Tires of America, Inc. v. CIT Group/Equip. Fin., Inc., 82 F.

Supp. 2d 434 (W.D. Pa. 2000) (citing the Treatise and adopting this approach).
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Thus, if the changed circumstance and its effect are unforeseeable
under the probability test, a court should grant some relief if

performance as agreed was made impracticable. But, again, increased
costs alone might not be enough (even though B seems to be reaping a

windfall within the terms of the contract). Nevertheless, assuming
that they are, the Treatise suggests that the preferred rationale for

granting some relief is both the concerns of injustice produced by an
unbargained-for imbalance and the ability of a court to supply a term
that will do justice in cases where the parties did not intend to cover

the situation at hand."
But what relief is available if the court decides to do justice? The

normal relief is to discharge the contract as to future performance and
try to restore the balance through restitution or, in some cases,
protecting reliance.2" But can a court preserve the contract through
equitable orders and adjust the terms to restore some balance? The
Treatise suggests that there are ways to "reshape the contract so that
the duties of the parties will continue."29 These techniques, however,

are limited or partial. There is no suggestion that the common law
gives a court broad power to preserve and adjust as a method of relief,
and, despite the grant of such power in the UNIDROIT Principles of

International Commercial Contracts,3 there is no argument that such
power should be available. Such an argument would require a
detailed excursion past the existing case law into various theories
about contract (beyond rudimentary efficiency notions)31 that the
Treatise does not (and perhaps should not) undertake.3 2

27. Calamari & Perillo, supra note 6, § 13.21, at 531.
28. Id. § 13.23.
29. Id. § 13.23, at 535.
30. Professor Perillo is fully aware of the "imbalance, restoration" theory
advanced in the UNIDROIT Principles and other comparative law perspectives that
support broader relief. See Joseph M. Perillo, Force Majeure and Hardship Under the
UNIDROIT Principles of InternationalCommercial Contracts, 5 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp.
L. 5 (1997); see also Joseph M. Perillo, UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial Contracts: The Black Letter Text and a Review, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 281
(1994).
31. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 6, § 13.2, at 498, where the Treatise seems
to embrace Richard Posner's superior risk bearer test, with its ex ante focus. The
embrace, which lingers throughout, is not fully developed.
32. It is thought by some that relational theory, with its emphasis upon preserving
the contract and expanded duties of good faith, offers more support for the
readjustment remedy. See Richard E. Speidel, The Characteristicsand Challenges of
Relational Contracts, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 823, 837-46 (2000). The possibility is noted
and quickly dismissed in Farnsworth on Contracts § 9.9, at 666-67 (3d ed. 1998)
(courts express "reluctance to do more than allow a generous measure of
restitution"). The possibility is not discussed in Murray on Contracts § 115 (4th ed.
2001).
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IV.
When all is said and done, the contract principles of excuse for
changed circumstances in Anglo-American law have changed very
little in the last 100 years. Cosmetic changes aside, the modern law of
contract excuse closely follows the patterns developed in the late
nineteenth century in England and the United States.33 Despite wars,
recessions, inflation, and the traumatic force majeure events of
September 11, 2001, 4 contract doctrine (and the Treatise) state that
unless an event not foreseen as likely to occur creates an extreme
imbalance, the promisor assumes the risk unless it is otherwise
provided in the contract.35 Even if some relief is available, that relief is
limited to discharge and restitution rather than the preservation and
adjustment of the contract.36
In sum, Joe Perillo the Treatise writer accurately reports the
developments in Anglo-American law and takes no firm position on
the expansion of excuse doctrine or the relief available. The stability
of contract, therefore, is preserved where the audience is American
attorneys, judges, and students. Joe Perillo the comparative law
scholar, writing in another medium, however, discusses (and perhaps
approves) of the different positions taken in civil law and in the
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts.
Recognizing that these differences between U.S. law and civil or
"international" law may not be justified, he suggests (timidly,
perhaps) that the developments in continental and "international"
contract law may "show
the direction of the law (in the United States)
37
of the next century.
So my question, Joe, is this. Why don't you develop and support
your position in the Treatise, which is widely read, rather than burying
it in a relatively obscure journal with a limited audience? The wearing
of two scholarly hats when dealing with a common problem might be
explained if you were a young faculty member seeking tenure at a law
33. See, e.g., Kinzer Const. Co. v. State, 125 N.Y.S. 46, 54-55 (Ct. Cl. 1910); W.H.
Page, Development of the Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance, 18 Mich. L. Rev.
589 (1920); John D. Wladis, Common Law and Uncommon Events: The Development
of the Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance in English Contract Law, 75 Geo. L.J.
1575 (1987).
34. There is also the increased risk of retrospective government legislation in the
risk of "homeland" security. See Richard E. Speidel, Contract Excuse Doctrine and
Retrospective Legislation: The Winstar Case, 2001 Wis. L. Rev. 795.
35. Calamari & Perillo, supra note 6, § 13.20.
36. Id. § 13.23.
37. Joseph M. Perillo, Force Majeure and Hardship Under the UNIDROIT
Principlesof InternationalCommercial Contracts, 5 Tul. J. Int'l Comp. L. 5, 28 (1997).
In the process, I am identified as a prophet without honor in this country in that my
approach to adjustment for changed circumstances has been adopted by the
UNIDROIT Principles but rejected by courts and commentators in the United States.
See Richard E. Speidel, Court-Imposed Price Adjustments Under Long-Term Supply
Contracts,76 Nw. U. L. Rev. 369 (1981).
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school that looked down on treatises. But it makes less sense for a
senior and respected scholar like yourself to be so cautious, especially
in an era when the distinctions between domestic and international
commercial law and between common law and civil law are
increasingly blurred. So my recommendation for a revised chapter
thirteen in the fifth edition of the Treatise is simple: You have the
audience, you are respected, so go for it!

